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ABSTRACT
The typical economic model implicitly assumes that the set of goods in an economy never
changes. As a result, the predicted efficiency loss from a tariff is small, on the order of the
square of the tariff rate, If we loosen this assumption and assume that international trade can
bring new goods into an economy, the fraction of national income lost when a tariff is imposed
can be much larger, as much as two times the tariff rate. Much of this paper is devoted to
explaining why this seemingly small change in the assumptions of a model can have such
important positive and normative implications. The paper also asks wby the implications of new
goods have not been more extensively explored, especially given that the basic economic issues
were identified more than 150 years ago. The mathematical difficulty of modeling new goods
has no doubt been part of the problem. An equally, if not more important stumbling block has
been the deep philosophical resistance that humans feel toward the unavoidable logical
consequence of assuming that genuinely new things can happen at every juncture: the world as
we know iListhe result of a long string of chance outcomes.
Paul M. Romer
NBER
204 Jimipero Serra Blvd.
Stanford, CA 94305
and University California, BerkeleyMost economic theory starts from an implicit assumption that policy interventions do
notaffectthe set of goods available in the economy. Recent theoretical work shows that this
assumption severely restricts our analysis of growth in advanced economies. We can not
askhowpolicyaffects the aggregate rate of invention and innovation if we assumefromthe
outsetthatno new goods can beintroduced.Butthe assumptionthat thesetof goods is fixed
is just as restrictive for the analysis of growthin developingcountries. In particular, it keeps
us from studying how trade restrictions prevent new types of goods and new types of
productive activities from being introduced from abroad. The ultimate claim in this paper is
that a theoretical perspective implicitly based on the idea that no new goods can ever be
introduced leads to a substantial underestimate of the welfare costs of trade restrictions.
The discussion leading up to this final claim touches on larger issues surrounding the
conceptof"newness" and the lasting contribution that "new" growth theory can make to
economic analysis. The analysis of trade presented below is motivated by the neo-
Schumpeterian models of growth that have been developed in the last few years. These
models explicitly allow for the introduction into an economy of new or improved types of
goods. Early contributions to this branch of growth theory include Aghion and }Iowitt
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1992), Romer (1987, 1990), and Segerstrom, Anat,
and Dinopoulos, (1990). This branch of endogenous growth theory differs from the models
in Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), which emphasize external increasing retums, and from
models in Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991), which invoke perfect competition
and a broad concept of capital that can be accumulated forever without driving its marginalproduct to zero. Both the external effects and perfect competition models of endogenous
growth maintain the assumption that new goods do not matter at the aggregate level.
The premise in the neo-Schumpetcrian models is that every economy faces virtually
unlimited possibilities for the introduction of new goods. Advanced nations can discover
new goods. Developing countries can import them. The term "good" is used here in the
broadest possible ense. A new good could take the form of an entirely new type of physical
good --thedigital computer in the 1950s. A new good could also be a quality improvement
over an existing physical goodthis year's generation of more powerful personal
computers. With no fundamental change in the underlying economic analysis, new goods
can be modeled either as consumption goods, as in Grossman and Helpman.(1992), or as
inputs in production, as in Romer (1990).
We tend to think of goods as tangible objects, but clearly they need not be. When a
software engineer writes a computer progrem, she produces a new good. Less obviously,
when a process engineer finds a better way to manufacture a product or a manager finds a
better way to monitor inventories and distribute goods, they also produce an insight or
discovery that is a new good in all of the relevant senses of the word. These discoveries
have economic value and are costly to produce. The language used to describe the neo-
Schumpeterian models emphasizes tangible goods, but the logic applies equally well to
intangibles.
If there are almost limitless numbers of conceivable goods that can be introduced into
any economy, there must also be some fixed cost associated with the introduction of each
new good. Otherwise, every valuable good would already be in use everywhere. The
2modeling innovation in the neo-Schumpeterianmodelsof growth is that they take explicit
account of the fixed costs thatlimit theset of goods and show that these fixed costs matter in
a dynamic analysis conducted at the levelofthe economy as a whole. This contrasts with
the standard approach in general equilibrium analysis, in which fixed costs are assumed to be
of negligible importance in markets of realistic size.
There is, of course, an extensive literature in industrial organization that takes fixed
costs seriously, including a specialized literature on patent races that emphasizes the costs
associated with the intioduction of new goods. Macroeconomists and general equilibrium
theorists who work at the level of the economy as a whole seem not to be impressed with the
importance of the lessons from these microeconomic analyses. The neo-Schumpeterian
growth models stress just one of the assumptions from the microeconomic literature, that
there are fixed costs. These new growth models do not capture the complicated strategic
interactions that emerge when there are only a small number of firms in a market. The
models nevertheless show that the presence of fixed costs is sufficient to overturn important
parts of the conventional wisdomconcerningpositive and normative analysis at the aggregate
level.
In particular, the neo-Schumpeterian models emphasize a point that should already
have been clear from the preceding work in new trade theory. (See for example, Helpman
and Krugman, 1985.) Trade policy can have large positive and normative effects because it
can influence not just quantities or existing goods as traditional trade theory suggests, but
also the number of different types of goods that are available in an economy. (For example,
Feenstra, 1992, gives a calculation of welfare losses from trade restrictions that takes account
3of these effectsj This important implication of new trade theory has sometimes been
overshadowed by an emphasis on the ex post monopoly rents that also arise in models with
fixed costs.
Because the traditional argument for free trade relies on perfect competition and
because perfect competition can not be sustained when there are important fixed costs, fixed
costs have been used to justify all manner of government intervention, including trade
restrictions. Nevertheless, the ultimate claim of the paper is that taking account of fixed
costs actually strengthens the arguments in favor of free trade.
Formally, it is true that the equilibria in the neo-Schumpeterian models are not Pareto
optimal, and by definition, this raises the theoretical possibility that some form of collective
action could improve on decentralized outcomes. This does not, however, imply that there is
a feasible policy that a real government could implement that would lead to a Pareto
improvement. Even if one believes that the government can improve on market outcomes,
this does not mean that trade policy is the right tool for trying to do so. And even if one
grants the need for intervention and even if trade policy is the only tool the government can
use, it does not follow that trade restrictions move the economy in the right direction.
The argument developed here, that trade restrictions can be very harmful, is an
application of a familiar result from second-best analysis. If the economy starts at a position
that is not first-best Pareto optimal, an intervention that moves the economy in the right
direction will have first order effects that increase welfare. But interventions that move the
economy in the wrong direction will have first order effects that reduce welfare. In contrast,
if the economy starts from an equilibrium that is first-best Pareto optimal, all interventions
4have effects that are second-ordersmall.Asa result,theassertionthat an equilibrium is not
flrstbestPareto optimal does not validate any arbitrary intervention. It just raises the stakes.
Trade restrictions are a little bit harmful in the usual model of perfect markets. Theyare
very harmful in the second best world with fixed costs described below.
The first irony inherent in the analysis is therefore that a model of imperfect markets
captures more accurately the true welfare costs of trade restrictions than does a model of
perfect markets. A second irony stems from the observation that new growth theory is about
newness (or at least th neo-Schumpeterian branch of new growth theory is about newness),
but the theory itself is not new. The term "neo-Schumpeterian" has the advantage that it
acknowledges Joseph Schumpeter's emphasis of the fixed costs associated with intentional
invention and innovation, but the roots of the analysis of new goods can be traced back to
much earlier work. In one of the very first uses of the concept of a demand curve, the
French engineer Jules Dupuit (reprinted in 1969) outlined the essential points: New goods are
associated with fixed costs, and fixed costs pose serious difficulties for decentralized market
allocation schemes.
Dupuit wrote about new goods more than 150 years ago. Economists are inundated
with new goods in their daily lives. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that the potential for
newgoods still plays such a small role in aggregate economic analysis. In its discussion of
the deeper implications of newness, this paper outlines two different forces that may have
tended to keep newness in the background. The most obvious restraining force is the
technical difficulty of constructing economy-wide mathematical models with fixed costs. The
importance of mathematical difficulty has been noted before. (See for example the
5introduction in Krugman, 1990, or the initial sections of Romer, 199L) New goods, fixed
costs, and market power are relatively easy to capture in a partial equilibrium model, but
much harder to incorporate in analysis conducted at the-level of the economy as a whole.
Yet in the last 15 years, we have made significant progress in overcoming the
technical limitations imposed by our mathematical tools. In industrial organization, wade,
and growth,we have beenable to build on the model of differentiated products introduced by
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and bynowhave accumulated quite a bit of experience with
aggregate-level analysis in models with fixedcostsand market power. if wenowhave the
technical tools to handle economy-wide models with nonconvexities, why is it that the
potential for new goods has not yet been widely incorporated into economic analysis?
The arguments presented below suggest that there may be a second difficulty that we
face in coming to terms with the enormous potential for new things to happen, one that
economic historians (for example, Paul David, 1985) and a few abstract theorists (for
example, Brian Arthur. 1989) have emphasized for some time. Once we admit that there is
room for newness --thatthere are vastly more conceivable possibilities than realized
outcomes —wemust confront the fact that there is no special logic behind the world we
inhabit, no particular justification for why things are the way they are. Any number of
arbitrarily small perturbations along the way could have made the world as we know it turn
out very differently.
These kinds of abstract concerns may seem to be far removed from the problems
faced by someone who offers advice about economic policy decisions in a developing
country. But as section VI of this paper will show, the implicit assumptions we adopt
6because of mathematical familiarity and philosophical predisposition can decisively influence
our analysis of a practical question such as how trade restrictions affect an economy.
Section 1 of thepaperstarts byillustratingsome of the strengths and weaknesses
inherent in the use of formal mathematics in economic theory. The discussion suggests that
when general equilibriumtheory removed thedistinctionbetween static and dynamic
analysis, the benefits from this theoreticalunification were accompanied by a loss in the
appreciation that someverbaltheorists had for thealmostinfinite possibilitiespresentedto us
by the physicalworld. This sectionshows how the apparentlyinnocuousconvexity
assumptionsadoptedby general equilibrium theorists made it impossibleforeconomists to
study the emergence of new goods in any interesting sense. Section II showshowour
neglect of new goods leads to a corresponding blind spot in the partial equilibrium analysis
of surplus triangles. Section III then expands on the possible role that our philosophical
predispositions play in influencing how we think about the world. It argues that what
philosophers have called the principle of plenitude exercises a much stronger influence over
how economists approach the world than we might care to admit.
Section IV recapitulates the economic analysis of the decision to build a new bridge
that was first presented by Dupuit, and section V puts Dupuit's partial equilibrium insights
into the kind of explicit, general equilibrium framework that is necessary if we are to draw
conclusions about national economic policy. In some ways, section V is intended as a partial
vindication of the use of formal mathematics in economic theory. It is probably true that
formal methods encouraged the profession to pull back from difficult and challenging
questions when they were first introduced. As we developed our mathematical skills, we
7focused on the simple issues that lent themselves most readily to mathematical analysis. But
now, mathematical theory has developed to the point where it can uncover points that Dupuit
and the verbal theorists who followed after him missed. Specifically, section V shows that a
familiar partial equilibrium insight about perfect price discrimination does not carry over to a
model of the economy as a whole. In a general equilibrium setting, price discrimination or
multi-part pricing can not resolve the decentralization problem associated with the
introduction of new goods. There is no simple, Fareto efficient, decentralized solution to the
problem of deciding which of the many conceivable new goods should be introduced into an
economy.
The larger implication that follows from this chain of arguments should be sobering
not only for economists accustomed to the viewpoint that economic behavior can be
represented as a Pareto optimal outcome of a simple model, but also for economists who
believe that the government stands ready to improve on market outcomes. Despite the
demonstration that it is theoretically possible to improve on the no-intervention outcome in
economies where new goods are important, it is not clear that any actual government will be
able or willing to undertake policies that are welfare improving. What is clear is that many
governments intervene in ways that substantially reduce welfare. Section VI gives an
illustrative calculation designed to show why trade restrictions, one of the most common
forms of government intervention in the developing world, might be far more costly than the
traditional analysis, with its fixed set of goods, has led us to believe.
8I. GeneralEquilibriumAnalysis and NewGoods
Changing to models that allow for new goods requires a subtle but important shift in
the unexamined assumptions and habits of thought that we bring to any problem. By their
very nature, these habits and assumptions are thingsthatwe take for granted, so it takes an
effort to bring then to the surface and subject them to analysis. To do this, it helps to go
back prior to the introduction of formal equilibrium theory and retrace some of the logical
steps that led to the unification between dynamic analysis and static analysis that mainstream
economists now take as obvious.
When Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter, or other pit-general equilibrium theorists
described the methods of economic analysis, they routinely distinguished static analysis from
dynamic analysis. This distinction was mirrored in the distinction that economists made
between equilibrium states and processes characterized by disequilibrium. This distinction is
still used by economists such as Schultz (1975) who were trained prior to the advent of
general equilibrium theory and by others who have deliberately moved outside of mainstream
mathematical economic theory, such as Nelson and Winter (1982) or the contributors to the
volume edited by Dosi, et al. (1988).
After general equilibrium theorists gave their description of a general economic
equilibrium with dated goods and state-contingent goods, the apparent distinction between
statics and dynamics disappeared from equilibrium analysis, as did the distinction between
certain and uncertain outcomes. Suddenly it became clear that the methods and modes of
9analysis that economists could apply to the problem illustrated in figure 1 are the same
regardless of the labels on the axes. The choice illustrated in the figure could be between
apples and oranges today. Or it could be between apples today and apples tomorrow. It
could even be between oranges tomorrow if there is a frost and oranges tomorrow if there is
not.
This unified approach to dated, state contingent goods ultimately led to a new and
fundamentally different set of mental habits and presumptions. Over time, the gulf between
this new point of view and the earlier one became so large that it is now difficult for the
economists on the two sides to carry on a sustained intellectual discussion. For example,
mainstream mathematical economists and macroeconomists now understand an equilibrium to
be whatever happens. The concept no longer carries any presumption of stationarity. Just as
there is no reason for the number of apples produced and consumed to be the same as the
number of oranges, there is no reason in a dynamic equilibrium for the quantity of goods
produced and consumed today to be equal to the comparable quantities at future dates. That
is, there is nothing about figure 1 that requires a tangency point on the 45degreeline. In its
most general form, an economic equilibrium could be characterized by slow adjustment,
missing markets, nonconvexities, uncertainty, asymmetric information, chaotic dynamics, or
the like. Whatever takes place, it is by definition an equilibrium outcome. For people used
to looking at the world this way, it simply does not make sense to talk about disequilibrium
behavior.
Yet the economists who insist on the importance of disequilibrium phenomena can not
be dismissed as merely being confused. Nor is the disagreement here merely a semantic
10difference about how the word "equilibrium" should be defined and used. Economists who
view the world from the new general equilibrium point of view arc aware of how much
insightwe have gainedfrom the unifying power of the concepts such as state-contingent
goods and dated goods. In this they are surely right.
But economists on the other side of the gulf see that something important was lost in
the translation of traditional insights into mathematical terms. These critics arc at least
partially right, but the difficulty does not arise merely from giving a new meaning to the old
notion of an equilibrium. Nor does the difficulty lie with the unification of statics and
dynamics per se. Treating apples today and apples tomorrow as being just like apples today
and oranges today raises difficult questions about the ability of economic agents to form
expectations about future contingencies, but the increased emphasis on learning by advocates
of both rational expectations and bounded rationality suggests that disagreements about
expectations and rationality may be diminishing.
Instead, the most serious limitation inherent in the general equilibrium approach
comes from the convexity assumptions that preclude an analysis of the possibility that many
valuable new goods could be, but are not, produced in an economy. Asserting that a new
good could be introduced is equivalent to asserting that the economy is currently on the
boundary or edge of goods space. Figure 2 illustrates the only sense in which this can occur
if production possibilities sets (and preferences) are convex. According to the case illustrated
in this figure, no amount of good S is produced because no amount would be worth the cost
in foregone units of good X that it would take to produce any of good S. In fact, good S
hardly qualifies as a sgood at all. If we are not endowed with any amount of good 5, we
11would certainly not produce any of it, so economists can without loss of generality pretend
that good S simply does not exist. If there is a third good '1, which like X, is produced
in positive quantities, thereisno harm in merely removing the good S from the analysis
and proceeding on the assumption that the equilibrium in the economy takes place in the
interior of the X-Y goods space, exactly as depicted in figure 1. With convexity, we can
assume that all of the relevant goods already exist and assume away all goods that are not
produced. We can therefore assume that we are always in the interior of goods space.
Figure 3 illustrates how a valuable good can exist without being produced in a
decentralized equilibrium. The figure requires, however, a nonconvexity that lakes the form
of a fixed cost. The production set in this figure illustrates the assumption that production of
good Z can be made possible at a cost of x1-x2unitsof good X. Suppose for now that
the economy is endowed with )C but does not produce any amount of good Z. Suppose
also that a positive quantity of a third good Y is also being produced. If economists
followed the procedure outline above --removingfrom consideration all goods that are not
already being produced and that are not part of the endowment bundlethey would remove
from consideration an alternative that is relevant for this economy. As figure 3 is drawn,
utility for the representative agent in this economy would be higher if good Z was
introduced and a large enough quantity was produced.
The fundamental premise in this paper is that the presence of a potentially valuable
good like good Z that has not yet been introduced into the economy is not the exceptional
case. Rather, it is the goods that have been introduced that are exceptional. Every real
economy is presented with an almost incomprehensible number of new goods that can be
12introduced. Some of these goods are like good Z in figure 3. They would increase utility.
Many others, perhaps the great majority of all possible new goods, would not be worth
introducing. The fixed costs are too high and the benefits too low. Out of the enormous set
of possible new goods, a very small number are somehow selected and introduced. In some
overall sense, the problem represented by figure 1 —therelatively simple problem
emphasized in most of economic theory of deciding between different quantities of existing
goods —isfar less common and far less important then the problem illustrated in figure 3.
The economy must decide whether each potential new good is worth the cost it takes to bring
it into existence. And the simple diagrammatic analysis offered here vastly understates the
complexity of the decision to introduce a good, because the value of any particular new good
will depend through complicated chains of complementarity and substitution on the other
goods that are present.
Convexity assumptions, which appear to be made purely for technical convenience,
therefore have the substantive effect of removing from consideration the most challenging
problem confronting an economy. They also limit the ability of a dynamic model to explain
basic facts such as that we have personal computers and our grandparents did not. Dynamic
general equilibrium models with state contingent goods and convex production set may be
useful for some purposes, but the critics are right that there is something fundamental and
important about the evolution of an economy that equilibrium models based on convex sets
can not capture.
13Ii. Partial Equilibrium Analysis and New Goods
Many economists would argue that the actual influence of general equilibrium theory
is quite limited and that in day to day reasoning, most economists rely primarily on supply
and demandcurves. The RorschachLestfor the attitude thatthese economists have toward
newgoodsis to present them with figure 4 and ask them to describe the first thoughts that
come to mind. The figure can represent a markup of price over marginal cost that results
from market power. lt could also describe a competitive industry with a tax distortion
between price and marginal cost. To keep things simple, set aside the niggling disputes
about consumer surplus as a welfare measure. Assume that the demand is derived from a
production process and prices are measured in units of output from this process. In this
case, the demand curve is a marginal productivity schedule. Any areas underneath the curve
can rigorously be interpreted as having units of output. To be specific, suppose that the
demand curve represents the marginal productivity of some good Z in producing another
good X. The marginal cost curve then represents the opportunity cost, in units of the output
good X when resources are diverted into the production of good Z.
The interesting question in this version of a psychologist's ink blot test concerns the
policy conclusions that an economist attaches to the different labeled areas under the curve.
In textbook treatments, and also in the unguarded reaction of many economists, the familiar
deadweight triangle labeled C in the figure is the primary focus of attention. Sometimes
attention turns as well to the net revenue rectangle B. In a first pass analysis, the
14• redistribution of wealth associated with this rectangle is often ignored. In a second pass,
circumstances in which redistribution is a genuine policy concern may be noted. For
• example, if the demand curve represents demand from the rest of the world and the
difference between price and marginal cost is an export tariff, the revenue rectangle
I'! representsan increase in national income that comes at the expense of foreigners. ('This
optimal tariff issue was emphasized in classical trade theory.) Alternatively, the figure could
represent the price and quantity decisions of a firm with market power that sells to the rest of
• the world. (This monopoly rent issue tends to be emphasized in discussions of strategic trade
policy that arise from results in new trade theory.) In either case, the revenue rectangle
represents a net redistribution of income in favor of domestic citizens.
The randomly selected economist taking this version of the ink blot test probably will
not cite the triangle A a.s having any particular welfare significance. This triangle
represents a pure surplus of some sort, the recipient of which may not at first be apparent.
In any event, it is almost always understood to be of no policy concern. The market creates
a surplus, but that is what markets are supposed to do.
H But this surplus ought to make economists pause. When a quantity of inputs a3 is
used in the production process which generates the marginal productivity schedule, it
produces an amount of output equal to the area A+B+D. The market, however, values the
units of Z at z'p =B+D.The market rewards the bundle of goods a1 by paying it only
a portion of the output that produces, and this will be true regardless of the amount of good
Z in the bundle.
In competitive markets, prices work at the margin. If good Z already existed, then
15prices that are equal to marginal cost give the right signals about how much of Z to use in
this production process. But these prices do not attach the correct overall value to the
associated bundle of goods, and can not be used as a guide in the decision about whether or
not to incur a cost and invent good Z.
This divergence between the social and market valuations of this bundle is a real
divergence with potentially important welfare implications. It can be neglected in the
standard analysis only because the standard analysis always assumes that the good Z
already exists and that only the marginal question matters. If the world is as depicted in
figure 1 -- if goods Z and X both exist, -- then the usual deadweight triangle is the only
one that need concern us. All of the action would indeed take place at the margin, in the
interior of goods space. But if the world is as depicted in figure 3, the important action is
on the boundary We must decide whether to incur some fixed cost to make it possible to
produce good Z. The iota] cost of producing z1 units of good Z will be the fixed cost of
introducing good Z plus the marginal cost represented by area D. In deciding whether to
introduce the bundle Z, this cost should be compared with the total amount of output that it
produces (area A+B+D) not with the value attributed to it by the price system (area B+D.)
III. The Principle of Plenitude
The convenient but very powerful assumption that we never have to face the decision
about whether to invent a good like good Z in figures 3 or 4 is a special case of a general
presumption or habit of thought that the philosopher Arthur Lovejoy (1933) labeled the
16principle of plenitude. (For a discussion of the economic implications of this principle,see
Warsh, 1984.) The principle of plenitude states that the world is full: every conceivable
entity already exists. As a corollary, it follows that nothing truly new can ever come into
being. Every conceptual possibility already has a realization in the physical world. To an
economist, it means that we can always assume that we are in the interior of goods space.
As Lovejoy shows, the principle of plenitude is fully formed in the writings of Plato
and has played a central role in Western thought ever since1 appearing prominently, for
example, in the writings of Spinoza and Leibniz. The set of all conceivable entities
corresponds to Plato's world of ideals. For every ideal there must exist a corresponding
entity in the world of experience, for otherwise the world would be incomplete and
imperfect.
Much of the thrust of modem scientific inquiry has been directed at overcoming our
innate prejudice in favor of predetermination and plenitude. Many educated people are
contemptuous of creationists who claim that there is a supreme being that created all existing
forms of life according to a master plan and who deny the possibility that different forms of
life emerged by chance and will continue to do so. We also ridicule the turn of the century
head of the patent office who recommended the abolition of the patent system because
everything had already been invented. Yet in their everyday approach to economic
problems, most economists adopt a modeling strategy that reflects an implicit belief closely
related to that of the patent clerk and the creationist.
The durability of the principle of plenitude can presumably be traced to a deeply
rooted human desire to understand the world and therefore to believe that the world is
17capable of being understood. If we admit that new things can happen --thatthere are many
things that could exist that do not yet exist --weundermine our most common explanation of
why the world is the way it is: It has to be this way for it could not have turned out
otherwise. For example, if there is only one conceivable form of intelligent animal, then we
can explain why humans had to emerge from evolution in precisely the form that they did.
People simply could not have turned out differently.
When it is applied in a specific scientific context such as evolution, it is now obvious
that the principle of plenitude is not just false; it is wildly misleading. The fossil record
shows us that there are many conceivable types of animals that once existed but no longer
exist. There are an extraordinarily large number of types of forms of life that could have
evolved but did not because of a variety of historical accidents. If the earth had not been hit
by the meteor that killed the dinosaurs, the forms of life on earth today would be different in
ways that we can hardly begin to imagine. Scientifically, a far better guiding principle
would that of sparsity: only a vanishingly small fraction of all conceivable entities can
actually exist in the physical world.
When we are confronted with things we do not understand, we all retreat into a world
view that has more in common with the creationists than we would like to admit. Take
cosmology. Implicitly, most of us believe that there is only one kind of physical universe
that is conceivable. We can therefore explain (in some limited sense) why the universe is the
way it is. lt could not have turned out otherwise. For example, space must have three
dimensions instead of two or four because, we assert, there is no such thing as two or four
dimensional real space, even in principle. As unsatisfying as this style of explanation may
Isbe, most of use find it preferable to the alternative. It is deeply unsettling to admit that
humans,other animals, our planet,even the universe itself, are merely the result of a long
sequence ofaccidents thatdetermined whichof many different conceivable outcomes were
actually realized.
Modern cosmologysuggests our universeitself isnew. At somedate therewasa big
bang whenbothspaceandtime as we knowthemcame into existence.Andas if this were
not enough, some physicistsarenow seriously raising the possibility that it was only our
particular universe that was created in what we refer to as 'the' big bang. This extension of
the inflation model of big bangs suggests that our universe emerged from a small local
fluctuation in the energy density in some prior universe, and that many comparable universes
are continually branching off from our own and many other universes, expanding in their
own big bang. Because these other universes start from slightly different initial conditions,
the physical laws that they obey may be radically different from our own.
We would prefer to believe that there is only one kind of universe and that any
universe could not possibly have turned out differently from the one -we inhabit. But to
theoretical physicists, the humotous physics exam question, 'Define universe and give two
examples,' isstartingto look serious. Perhaps the fact that space in our universe isthree
dimensional is an accidental outcome that is no more explicable than the fact that there are
no mammals that lay eggs and fly.
-
Whateverone's reaction is to the possibility that there could be, or will be, or are
many different universes, nothing could be more certain than the facts that there are many
different types of economic goods, that there will be many more of them in the future, and
19that these will somehow be selected from an incomprehensibly larger set of goods that could
conceivably be produced. To see why the set of all conceivable goods is so much larger than
the set of goods that could ever be produced in our universe, one need only do a few simple
combinatorial calculations. Consider for example, the set of all possible computer programs
thatcouldfit on the lowest capacity floppy disk still in use for personal computers. Such a
floppy disk can store a bit string consisting of 360,000 x S positions, each of which contains
either a 0 or a I. This means that there are about 23,00orabout 10ia°different
conceivable computer programs (i.e. bit strings) that could fit on such a disk. This is a big
number. For comparison, about l0 seconds have passed since the big bang started the
universe (or the current version of our particular universe.) It is estimated that there are
about BY" electrons and protons in the visible portion of our universe.
Most of the possible bit strings will be totally useless as computer programs, but
unless we are willing to side with the patent clerk and suggest that all the useful software has
already been written, there must be a small fraction of these possible programs, perhaps just
one in every l0"", that will do wonderful things. This would still leave lO interesting
programs to discover. (liven the physical constraints we face it is inevitable that the vast
majority of these useful programs will never be written or tested. For example if we had
used every atom in the universe to code a different bit, at any time we could only code up
about i0' different bit strings that are 106 bits long. If we had tested a new set of 10"
new bit strings every second since the big bang, we would still not have tried only one out of
every billion of all the possible bit strings. It is an inevitable fact of life that economies will
forever operate on the boundary of goods space, that only a small subset of all possible
20goods will ever be introduced.
The principle of plenitude manifests itself in the everyday operation of economic
analysis in the implicit assumption that nevertheless, all the relevant goods already exist. It
lets us think of economic analysis as taking place in the interior of goods space. It lets us
tell our students thatthe essentialeconomic problem is depicted in figure 1, not figure 3.
Economists do recognize that the set of traded goods in an economy is always changing, but
according to the economic version of plenitude, this turbulence is an epiphenomenon of no
fundamental interest. According to this view, you can change the labels on a box of
detergent, but detergent is just detergent. According to this view, all decisions in private
markets can accurately be characterized as being like changes in the allocations of the
quantities of a fixed and unvarying set of underlying goods that cover all of the relevant
possibilities. Perhaps the clearest statement of this point of view comes in the characteristics
space description of goods articulated by Kelvin Lancaster (1966). All apparently new goods
are just different bundles of a fixed underlying set of primitive goods.
Economists have not always gone this far. Joseph Schumpeter was quite explicit
about the central importance of the creation of genuinely new goods (1934). Sn was Allyn
Young (1928). Yet in our post-WWII enthusiasm for distilling the "miracle of the market"
down to its mathematical essence, economists have generally been willing to push these
issues aside. Decentralized markets could be shown to get everything right only by assuming
that half of our basic economic problem (and by far more difficult half at that) had already
been solved. In the Arrow-Debreu world, all the relevant or useful dated and state-
contingent goods have already been selected from the large set consisting of all possible
2!goods. The only problem that remained for the economic system to solve was to allocate
existing goods between a fixed set of existing uses.
It was perhaps this step, the implicit incorporation of the principle of plenitude, rather
than the unification of statics and dynamics per se, that troubled those economists who
dissented from the generaJ equilibrium approach to economic theory. The refutation of the
principle of plenitude seems to lie at the heart of case that has been made for path
dependence and the role of history in economic analysis by Arthur (1989) and David (1985).
Much of the explicit discussion by the critics of general equilibrium theory has
focused on issues other than path dependence or the sparsity of the set of reaiized goods.
Instead, critics have emphasized the suboptimality of market outcomes and the implausibility
of the assumption of rational choice. On these issues, the mainstream economists and the
critics are not very far apart. Mainstream economics is filled with arguments showing that
equilibria are in many cases not first-best Pareto optimal, and mainstream equilibrium
theorists increasingly emphasize the importance of informational constraints, costs of decision
making, and of the importance of learning processes that converge slowly, if at all, to the
outcome derived from the assumption of fully informed rational calculation. Disagreements
between the critics and mainstream economists over these issues are really over no more than
differences in degree.
It is a deeper difference in the presumptions that different people have about the
nature of the world and the nature of the problem that an economic system must solve that
separates the different groups of economists and makes communication so difficult. When
economists insist on the importance of disequilibrium behavior, part of what they must be
22saying is that out of all conceivable goods, only a very sparse subset can actually exist in any
real economy, so genuinely new goods can always be added. Any analysis that treats a
dynamic economy as being formally equivalent to a static economy characterized by
plenitude -. fullnessinthe set of goods -- can not, according to this view, capture the
essential aspects of growth and change.
After being lectured about the philosophical origins underlying the selection of
different areas in figure 4, the economist subjected to the Rorschach test described in the
previous section could complain of having been tricked. If we had explained that the demand
curve in figure 4 was for a good that did not yet exist, then he would of course have
commented on the welfare significance of the triangle A. Moreover, this economist could
observe with irritation, the point argued here (about newness) is "not new. • There is an old
literature on marginal cost pricing and utility regulation (Hotelling, 1938) that is concerned
precisely with the problem of paying the fixed cost of bringing some service into being.
Similarly, economists have long understood that the problem of assigning patents or
copyrights involves a fundamental conflict between conflicting efficiency conditions.
Monopoly profits induce people to incur the fixed costs of invention, but cause distortions in
the allocation of goods once the invention exists. We have always known, this economist
could continue, that if the market had to solve two problems — both introducing the right
goods and allocating them properly — a competitive economy would never be able to get the
prices right. (Section V below challenges the fall-back position that is sometimes offered
suggesting that an economy characterized by monopoly power can get the prices right if price
discrimination is toleratedj
23But the question remains, why do economists assume, unless instructed otherwise,
thatallof the relevant goods already exist? Why is it that the problems associated with the
introduction and creation of goods are alwayspartof the footnotes or the marginalia? Why
is it that we devote so much more attention to the problem illustrated in figure I than to the
one illustrated in figure 37
IV. Building a Bridge
To illustrate how attention to the creation of new goods can change the emphasis one
places on different aspects of economic analysis and to emphasize that the arguments raised
here are indeed quite old, this section recapitulates the first analysis of the problem of
bringing a new good into existence. As head of an engineering district in 19th century
France, Jules Dupuit was responsible for building toads, bridges, and canals. Because the
tools he needed for cost-benefit or project analysis did not exist, he invented them. In a
paper published in 1844, he described both the demand curve and the revenue (i.e. "Laffer")
curve. He developed the familiar triangle approximation to the welfare cost of a tax, and
noted that it varied with the square of the tax wedge. Apparently without knowledge of the
work of Cournot, he developed the theory of monopoly pricing. To this he added an
analysis of the welfare benefits of price discrimination.
As an engineer and a civil servant, Dupuit was motivated by the practical problem of
discovering rules he could use to decide whether a specific investment project like a bridge
should be built. Among his many cogent observations was the remark that the maximum net
24revenue that could be collected by simple monopolypricingis less than the total social value
createdby the bridge. Thus, even if the firm that builds the bridge has perfect property
rights and can extract the entire monopoly revenue forever, it collects an amount that is
strictly less than the value of the bridge to society. The monopolist can capture the rectangle
B+D in figure 4 but not the surplus triangle A. In honor of his observation and to
distinguish it from the usual deadweight triangle C, it is appropriate to call triangle A a
Dupuit triangle.
Harold Hotelling reprised Dupuit's analysis in his 1938 paper on railway and utility
pricing, and a substantial debate over marginal cost pricing ensued. (See Ruggles, 1949-50
for a survey.) .Thediscussion followed exactly the lines one would predict on the basis of
the principle of plenitude. Economists like Hotelting recognized that there is a fixed cost
that must be covered if the bridge builder is to break even, but all of the attention is
addressed to the formal question of how to avoid the losses associated with deadweight
triangles. With few exceptions (e.g.Coase, 1946), the analysis ignores Dupuit's practical
concern, how to decide which of the many conceivable bridges in the world should actually
come into existence. Economists like Hotclling implicitly took it as given that we knew
which bridges to build (and which ones not to) and worried only about how to finance them.
To the modern reader, the description given by Hotelling or Meade (1944) of the
advantages of having the government build bridges, operate railroads, and socialize
production in all other instances where there are large fixed costs seems rather naive. In
part, this reflects subsequent experience with how governments actually function. We have
seen too many cases in which a bridge or roadway is built at great expense and then allowed
25to deteriorate beyond repair because the government in a developing nation or a city in the
United States postpones relatively minor maintenance expenditures. But our reaction to the
analysis is also colored by a sense that the welfare losses under consideration are relatively
small. Few modern economists think that the deadweight triangles associated with bridge
tolls or railroad fares that exceed marginal cost add up to welfare losses that are more than a
trivial fraction of total GD?.
Our sense of the relative magnitudes derives in large part from a pioneering set of
papers published in the 1 950s by Arnold Harberger. They offered back-of-the-envelop
calculations of the economy-wide welfare losses caused by resource misallocations. The first
paper focused on monopoly power distortions in the United States analogous to those caused
by setting a bridge toll that is higher than marginal cost (Harberger, 1954). Total losses,
Harberger calculated, were on the order of a few tenths of a percent of GNP. The second
paper estimated the costs of trade restrictions for the Chilean economy: about 2.5% of GD?
(Harberger, 1959). These numbers had the bracing effect of forcing economists to be more
explicit about the relative importance that should be attached to each of the many conceivable
distortions that could exist in an economy. It was no longer enough to put a sign on a
welfare effecL The magnitude matters as well.
The key result behind such calculations was noted by Dupuit: welfare distortions
depend on the square of the wedge between price and marginal cost. This observation is
typically offered as a justification for why government intervention to remove small
distortions is not very important and why private sector distortions like monopoly power are
not very costly, but it also implies that the costs of misguided, harmful government
26intervention will also be relatively small. Viewed from this perspective,thetextbook
description of market equilibrium offers up a remarkably weak defense of laissez faire
policy. If markets are perfectly competitive,government intervention can do nogood,butit
also does littleharm.
Yet as noted above, the current professional consensus (mirrored for example by the
World Bank's World Development Report for 1991) is that the policies of protection and
import substitutionfollowedformanyyears by countries like Chile severely reduced welfare.
There are only two ways toreconcile thisviewwiththelogic behindHarberger'sestimates.
The estimates of thelossesfrom deadweighttrianglesmightbetoo low because the true size
ofthetraded goodssector,the true elasticitiesofdemand,orthe true tariff rates are an order
of magnitudelarger theones used in his calculations, but we can measure these quantities
relativelywell andan order of magnitudeerrorseems quite unlikely. A more likely
explanation is thatthe lossesassociated withdeadweighttriangles may indeed be small, but
thatthereareother, muchmoreimportant losses associated with thelossof largenumbersof
Dupuit triangles.
To illustrate how the Dupuit triangles might enter the analysis, return to Dupuit's
analysis of a bridge. Suppose that a foreign firm would be willing to incur a fixed c0 to
build a bridge if it could charge the simple monopoly price for bridge crossings. Consider
the pricing problem for the bridge builder under the simplifying assumption that the marginal
cost of bridge crossings is zero. If the bridge is built, the Dupuit triangle under the demand
curve and above the monopoly price represents a pure surplus gain to society. The
deadweight triangle represents the additipnal gains that could be achieved if the price for
27crossings were set equal to the marginal cost of zero.
Let p(x) denote the inverse demandcurve for bridge crossings. A monopolistic
bridgebuilder will maximize revenue p(x)x.Thefamiliar first order condition is
(1) p(x)tp'(x)x—O.
In this simple one period model, assume that the revenue that the monopolist collects is
larger than the cost c0 of building the bridge. If it were not, the firm would not be willing
to undertake construction. (In a multiperiod model, c0 would be the interest and
maintenance cost of the bridge in each period.)
Now suppose that the government levies a simple ad valorem tax r on bridge•
crossings. The monopolist maximizes net revenue (1-r)p(x)x. The new first order condition
is
(2) (l—r)p(x)(l—r)p'(x)x=O,
which clearly yields the same solution for x and p as does the monopoly problem with no
taxes. Provided that the bridge is still built, the tax acts like a pure profit tax on the bridge
builder (which we can take to be a foreign owned multinational corporation, the profits of
which are of no concern to the domestic government.) The tax has no effect on the size of
the deadweight triangle and causes no additional distortions. So far, we have only restated
the usual result that a pure profits tax induces no distortions.
But at the point where the after-tax revenue just equals the cost of the bridge,
(l-r)p(x)x c the welfare effects of the tax change discontinuously. For any larger tax,
28the bridgeis not builtand the entire Dupuit surplus triangle is lost to the economy. Because
thetaxextracts wealthfromforeigners, domesticwelfare increases monotonically with the
taxrate, up to the point where the bridge is not built. Then welfare drops sharply,toa level
below the welfare achieved when no tax is imposed.
For a developing country, far more is at stake than bridges, roads and the kind of
civil engineering project that we usually associate with cost-benefit analysis. The more
important tosses are likely to arise from the absence of economic goods that are never
imported and made available in a developing country --thecapital goods that are not
imported, the production processes that could be but are not undertaken there, the many
possible entrepreneurial activities that are never attempted.
One of the fundamental premises of the argument offered here is that bringing each of
these different kinds of activities or goods into existence requires a fixed cost expenditure.
For a developing country, multinational firms are one of the most important sources of new
economic activities, and the fixed costs they face are easy to imagine if one works through
the details of their operations. One can think, for example, of the information a foreign
retailer must collect about quality, reliability, and capacity of suppliers before it can begin to
buy garments assembled in a new country. The retailer would have to establish new
financial relationships for clearing transactions and new shipping and communications links
for moving goods. It would have to learn about the local legal, regulatory, and tax
environment, and it would have to investigate the nature of political risk. It would also need
to invest in long term implicit and explicit contractual relationships for the trading
relationship to be successful.
29Evidence that fixed costs are important comes from the observation that many
services and goods are simply not available at any price in many parts of the world. 11 there
were no fixed costs, one should find that all possible goods, services, production processes
and types of exchange are available to firms located everywhere in the world. If local taxes
or other distortions are high or if transportation cost were high, prices might be higher there,
but the goods would still be available. One need not, however, rely purely on indirect
evidence. Direct studies have shown, for example, that it can be quite costly to transfer
production technology from an advanced to a developing country (Teece, 1977).
For the rich class of goods, services and activities contemplated here, there arc many
kinds of impediments that play the function of the tax rate rinthe bridge example. Tariff
and non-tariff barriers to the imports of key inputs and components, excessive tax rates,
restrictions on ownership, domestic content requirements, corruption, and bureaucratic
regulation can all have the sante effect as r,reducingthe revenue stream that acts as an
inducement for someone contemplating an initial fixed cost investment. The cumulative
effect of these indirect costs can be very large. A test case conducted in Peru in 1983
demonstrated that it took four uhiversity students 289 days of full time work to get the 11
permits needed to legally open a small garment assembly shop (de Soto, 1989). In addition
to reducing profits for any new enterprise, these kinds of distortions may also cause the usual
deadweight losses, but as Harberger's analysis shows, the deadweight losses are unlikely to
explain the large welfare costs that we now attribute to extensive intervention.
tn his analysis of prospects for Chile, Harberger pointed to the dynamic process of
technological change and diffusion of knowledge as the source from which large welfare
30gains couldbeextracted. If weinterpretthe processofdiffusion and adoption of new
technologies in a developing country as resulting from the introduction of new economic
activities that are made possible by fixed cost investments of the kind noted above, then
Harberger's diagnosis is exactly right. The true costs of badly designed government
interventions, and especially of trade restrictions in developing countries, come not from
their effects on the static allocation of resources between the activities in an economy that
already exist. Rather, they come from the stifling effect that the distortions have on the
adoption of new technologies, the provision of new types of services, the exploitation of new
productive activities, and on imports of new types of capital goods and produced inputs.
If one implicitly relies on the principle of plenitude and assumes that all of the
relevant or possible productive activities already exist in a developing country —thatis, if
one assumes that the essence of economic development is just to do more of the things that
the economy already does --1-larberger'sanalysis shows that the costs of realistic distortions
can not be too large. But if once one recognizes that there are many kinds of inputs in
production, many kinds of productive activities, many kinds of expertise and insight from the
rest of the world that could be Sut are not in use in a developing economy, one sees that the
welfare costs from distortions can be much higher.
The textbook analysis may therefore have it backwards. It may be taxes on ex post
profits, not taxes that change relative prices, that have the most severe welfare consequences.
If we restrict attention to the allocation of resources between a fixed set of goods, taxes on
profits are indeed irrelevant. But if the decisions about which goods to introduce are the
most important economic decisions that an economy makes, profit taxes may be the ones that
31truly matter. Moreover, an cx post profit tax that prevents a good or activity from coming
into being is particularly insidious because it leaves no trace of what might have been. The
bridge that is not built is as easy to overlook as the dog that did not bark.
V. Price Discrimination
As Dupuit observed in his partial equilibrium analysis, perfect price discrimination
would solve the problem of financing the fixed cost of introducing a new good if it were
feasible. Decentralized market mechanisms would then be able to solve the problem of
selecting which goods to introduce, and equilibria would be Pareto optimal. A modified
version of the price system, with a price schedule or a multi-part pricing arrangement, would
be able to solve both the problems facing an economy.
This section shows that two factors undermine a reliance on price discrimination to
achieve the social optimum. The first problem is that complete surplus extraction has
distributional effects that may be a serious policy concern in a developing nation. The
second, and conceptually more important point illustrated here is that multi-part pricing and
price discrimination can not be supported in a full equilibrium in many situations of practical
interest. In these cases, the partial equilibrium intuition derived from the study of a single
demand curve does not apply.
The infeasibility of a Pareto optimal decentralized equilibrium with multi-part pricing
is central to the specific claim of this paper --thattrade restrictions cause first-order welfare
32losses because the decentralized equilibria that actually arise are not first-best Pareto optimal.
But the analysisin this sectionisalso intendedas an illustration of the positivecontribution
that formal mathematics can make to economic analysis. As noted in the introduction, it is
likelythatan emphasisonexplicit mathematical formalism impeded the early analysis of
manyissues in economics becauseweinitiallyrelied onassumptionslikeconvexity that were
veryrestrictive. The exampleinthis section showsthatwhen we learn to weaken those
restrictive assumptions, the formal mathematics can reveal points that informal verbal
arguments miss.
Imagine that a small, less developed, economy produces output using capital Kand
labor Laccordingto a Cobb-Douglas production function Y L'-"K".Supposethat a
foreign industrialist has invented a new kind of capital input x. The new capital good can
then be used with labor and old capital to produce output according to I
This functional form is a simple special case of the constant elasticity of substitution
aggregator of the capital goods Kandx; (K+ry'. If p is equal to I, K and .r are
perfect substitutes and final production takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form in terms of labor
and a single capital aggregate. Imagine, however, that in this example, K represents
structures and x represents machinery. Because x is a new kind of capital good that is not
a perfect substitute for existing capital goods, p must be different from 1. For simplicity,
let p equal a, so that K and x enter production in an additively separable fashion. By
setting p bigger than or less than a, one could make K and x into complements or
imperfect substitutes.
Therelevantquestion in this simple example is whether the foreign industrialist can
33use price discrimination or multi-part pricing to capture all of the benefit associated with the
introduction of the good x into this economy. Assuming that the industrialist has strong
property rights over the invention of the good x --orequivalently, that the technology for
producing x is secretthe industrialist can certainly charge the simple monopoly price for
units of x used in this economy. The derived demand for x from competitive firms that
produce Y according to the specified technology is
(3) p(x) aL'x'.
From this expression, it is clear that the no matter what level of iithatthe industrialist
chooses to supply, simple monopoly pricing lets him capture only a fraction cofthe
increase in output that his actions induce. For any selected level of x, output goes up by
L1C, but the industrialist captures only p(x)x =aL½.It is tempting to assume that the
firm that purchases x captures the Dupuit surplus triangle and that the industrialist could
prevent this by setting a price schedule or by charging a fixed fee to each buyer plus a
charge for each unit sold. Assume for the moment that the industrialist has property rights
that are so strong that he can pievent the secondary market sales that typically undermine
these mechanisms for extracting surplus. The more fundamental problem here is that the
buyers of the capital goods have no surplus that the industrialist can extract. They are
competitive firms. They operate under conditions of constant retums to scale. They always
earn zero profits.
If the industrialist did structure pricing in an attempt at extracting more value than he
could extract under simple monopoly pricing, there would be no equilibrium in this
economy. Prior to the introduction of x, let wbethe wage for labor and let r be the rent
34on the existing capital good K.Supposethat the industrialist offers a firm a pricing schedule
that extracts a Lotal payment P(k) for x units of the new good. Suppose that the
industrialist chooses this schedule so that it extracts all of the additional output that the
introduction of x induces. Before x is introduced, Euler's theorem tells us that the firm
produces output Yequalto wL+rK.itearns zero profit. After being supplied with x
units of the new good, the firm would produce output equal to wL+rK+Pçt)since by
assumption, P(x)isequal to the increase in output induced by x. The firm would still
break even if wages for labor and the rental rate on capital Kremainedthe same after x is
introduced. If only a single small firm were offered the use of x, wages would indeed
remain constant. But of course, a profit maximizing industrialist will want to sell to all firms
that produce final output. In this case, the market wage for labor will increase to a new
value W > w because the new units of x raise the marginal productivity of labor. And if
wages go up, all final output firms will now earn negative profits, and the pricing schedule
P(x)cannot be sustained.
If the industrialist tries to scale back the pricing schedule to keep his customers from
failing, he will be forced all the way back to a constant price per unit of the good x. To see
why, let q denote the price of the last unit of capital purchased under the price schedule.
The output producing firm will purchase units of x until its marginal productivity is equal
to q. By Euler's theorem, if w' i5 equal to the new marginal productivity of labor and if
risequal to the marginal productivity of capital, the value of total output for a price-taking
firm thatemploysKunitsof structures, Lunitsof labor, and x units of machinery will
be Y = w'LsiC + qr. Consequently, if the industrialist charges a price per unit q for
35all of the units of machinery, the final output firms just break even. Any attempt to extract
additional surplus by imposing either an access fee for the right to buy the new capital good
or a higher price for the initial units of the good x will fail.
If the industrialist captures only a fraction of the benefits from the introduction of the
good a and if the producers of output earn zero profits, the remainder of the surplus
benefits must accrue to one of the other two factors of production in this economy, old
capital or labor. Because K and a are additively separable, the introduction of a has no
effect on rent for K, r =aC'K".Labor captures all of the surplus. After good a is
introduced, total wage income increases by (l-ct)L't, and this amount plus the revenue
captured by the industrialist is just equal to the increase in total output.
In this kind of general equilibrium setting, price discrimination does not help a
monopolist extract surplus, but vertical integration can, at least in some circumstances.
Suppose that the industrialist refuses to sell his good a. Instead, he purchases K and L
and uses them together with a to produce output directly. By doing so, he can take over all
production of final output and keep wages at their previous level, w =(I-cs)L)"K'.In this
way, he can avoid the wage gains that would otherwise give a fraction of the increase in
output to labor. This pattem of industrialization without wage gains is what it would take to
ensure that the industrialist captures all of the benefits he creates when he introduces
machinery. It is not a prescription for development that the citizens of a developing
countries will want to encourage. (As an aside, note that it also can not be a historically
accurate description of the process of development in industrialized countries, for if it were,
unskilled labor would still earn what it earned prior to the industrial revolution.)
36In additiontoits problematic implications for the distribution of the gains from
industrialization, this kind of vertical integration can support the Pareto optimum only if
there is no other sector in the economy that uses -labor. Suppose, for example, that it is also
possible to produce agricultural output using land T and labor according to a standard,
concave production function F(T,L). As x is introduced into the economy, the marginal
product of labor in the production of the manufactured good Y will increase, so optimality
requires that labor shift from agriculture into manufacturing. The industrialist can act as a
monopsonist, inducing labor into the manufacturing sector and raising wages only to the
extent that it is profitable for him to do so, but this will not lead to the Pareto optimum for
the standard reasons. And contrary to the usual partial equilibrium intuition, once again
there is no way for the industrialist to do better with price discrimination. Any scheme that
draws labor out of agriculture will raise the marginal productivity of labor in agriculture, and
an industrialist who controls the entire manufacturing sector can do nothing to stop
competition from agriculture from raising the wages he must pay. Only if the industrialist
can integrate horizontally and bring the entire economy under his control will he be able to
shift labor between sectors without changing wages. Only a command economy can move
resources between sectors without changing prices. The defense of monopoly therefore
degenerates into the traditiona] defense of central planning.
Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992) give conditions under which equilibria with multi-
part pricing will exist and a positive quantity of the good controlled by a monopolist will be
supplied. The reason why their result does not apply here is revealingTheir analysis
assumes that monopolists sell directly to final consumers They show that if the total value
37that the consumersplace on thegoodin questionis greater then the costs to the monopolist,
anequilibrium with multi-part pricing andpositivesupplyofthe goodwill exist. Their
result depends, however, on the presence of sufficient"willingnessto pay" on the part of the
people who purchase directly from the monopolist. The examples in this section show that if
the customers a monopolist sells to are competitive firms or if the inputs a monopsonist
purchases are also used by a competitive industry, the willingness to pay will be zero.
Competitive firms that buy the new input have no willingness to pay for the introduction of
the new good because they earn zero profits regardless of whether the good is introduced or
not. An individual laborer has no willingness to pay for the introduction of the new good
even though it increases wages for all workers; if workers in the industrial sector had to chip
in to pay for the introduction of the new good, they could simply move to the agricultura]
sector and get the benefits of higher wages without having to help pay for the new goods.
Even though the aggregate benefits from the introduction of the good exceed the cost
of introducing it, the benefits do not accrue to the competitive firms that are the buyers or to
the specific inputs that the monopsonist directly employs. As a result, multi-part pricing can
not be sustained unless the competitive markets that shift the benefits throughout the economy
are completely shut down.
VI. Relative Magnitudes
The previous section shows that simple monopoly pricing and Dupuit surplus triangles
38are endemic to decentraiized economies. Theywill be present whenever thefirms that
introduce new goods draw inputs from competitive industries or sell their output to
competitive industries. Since these Dupuit surpluses form the basis of the wage gains that
we associate with development, it is a good thing for the citizens of the developing world
that they exist.
The analysis so far has shown that any intervention that prevents a new activity from
coming into existence will be bad for development. It remains to show that aggregate losses
from lost Dupuit triangles can be large enough to be of serious policy concern.
To see why it is possible in principle for trade distortions to impose large social costs,
look again at the areas A and C under the demand curve in figure 4. Dupuit's analysis
taught us that the welfare losses associated with deadweight triangles are second-order small,
and Harberger's analysis showed that the aggregate losses from deadweight triangles typically
amount to a small fraction of CJDP. But Dupuit triangles can be quite large even when the
wedge between price and marginal cost is small. In fact, they get larger as the wedge gets
smaller. As a result, welfare losses vary in direct proportion with the number of Dupuit
triangles that are destroyed or prevented from corning into existence. A rough guide to the
welfare losses in any country will therefore be the difference between the range of productive
inputs that are available there and the range of productive inputs that could be put to use
there.
To illustrate these issues in a formal model, suppose that output can be written as a
function of labor L and a large quantity of different types of capital goods indexed by 1:
39(4) Y=LExr
This is just a many good version of the additivelyseparable, constantelasticity aggregator
for a large numberofdifferent kinds of capital goods. Instead of thinking of just two broad
categories such as structures and machinery, let i index many different types of capital
goods —blastfurnaces, lathes, fork lift trucks, looms, etc. —thatare not perfect substitutes
for each other. -
Asbefore, this functional form imposes the restriction that output must be a constant
returns to scale function of L and all N of the different inputs x. To maintain the
parallel with the model in the last section, all of the x's will be referred to as capital goods.
They could, or course, represent a much broader class of inputs in production, including
intermediate inputs or imported forms of specialized human capital. As in the example from
the last section, labor's share of total income will be 1-a, and in the aggregate, the share of
all the capital goods will be a.
To close the model, it remains to specify how the different capital goods x can be
produced and how N, the number of different types of goods is determined in equilibrium.
If this were intended as a model of growth in an advanced economy, the right way to close
the model would be to specify a research and development technology for inventing new
goods, (Different ways of doing this are illustrated in Romer, 1990, Rivera-Batiz and
Romer, 1991, and in the closely related model in Grossman and Helpman, 1991).) But for a
developing economy, it is more appropriate to assume that a very large set of productive
inputs already exists in the rest of the world, and each of them can be introduced into this
40economy after incurring a cost c0(i)thatcan depend on the index i. Instead of the single
foreign entrepreneur described in the last section who can introduce a new technology, there
are a large number of different foreign entrepreneurs, each of whom can incur a cost and
introduce a new type of productive input into this economy.
For example, if good 27 represents a rubber-tired front-end loader, the fixed cost
c(27) can be interpreted as the fixed cost of setting up a service and parts supply network
necessary before these loaders can be used in this economy. Alternatively, good 27 could
be the services of an engineering consulting firm that helps manufacturing firms implement
quality control systems in production, and c0(27) would represent the fixed costs of setting
up a local branch consulting office. The goods are arranged so that c0isincreasing in i.
For simplicity, we can assume that this dependence is linear, c0Q) =1d.We can also choose
the units for measuring quantities of the .r1's so that c1,themarginal cost of one additional
unit of each good, is the same for all goods.
Equation 4 describes the constant returns to scale production function that competitive
firms use to produce final output from labor and all available capital goods x. For each
possible input in production, there is a foreign entrepreneur that contemplates paying the
fixed cost c0Q)ofentering the local market. If it enters, it will maximize profit subject to
the downward sloping derived demand curve from the final goods producers. If the ex post
monopoly revenue it can extract is greater than c0(i),firmiwillenter. Good Nisthe
marginal good, the one on which entry costs just equal cx post monopoly revenue.
This setup is of course just a many-good version of the bridge problem outlined in
section IV. Also, for the reasons outiined in section V, only simple monopoly pricing can be
41sustained in equilibrium because the many different suppliers of capital goods all sell to
competitive uirmL
Because of the symmetry between all of the capital goods as inputs in final
production, all the firms that enter face the same derived demand and earn the same revenue.
Differentiating output with respect to the quantity of good i gives the marginal productivity
schedule or industry inverse demand curve, which takes exactly the same form as in the
previous example,
(5)
Because we want to study the effects of distortions in this economy, suppose that the
government imposes an ad valorem tax or tariffi-onall of the purchases of foreign
imported goods. II' the firm selling good i enters, it faces a profit maximization problem of
the form
(6) max (1 —r)p1(x)x—c1x.
Because the demand curve is a constant elasticity demand and because the cost of each unit
of the capital good made by firm i is constant, it is easy to verify that the solution to this
problem takes the familiar form of a constant proportional markup, p1fr) =c1/a(l-r).
Monopoly revenue net of east and taxes is then equal to cix*(l_&)/cr. In equilibrium, the
output level x*fr) will be the same for all goods and can be found by putting the expression
for p on the left side of equation 5 to yield
(7) x (r) r)L
42The expressions for p* and x*(r) can then be substituted into the expressions for the ex
post net revenue. Ignoring integer constraints,thesolution for the equilibrium number of
inputs Nfr) comes from equating the fixed cost of introducing the marginal good, tN, to
the expression for net revenue:
(r)
(8) L.a- I
= _! a ci (1-r)L
'Li
Usingequation 4 and the symmetry of all of the inputs, gross domestic product YJr)
can be written in terms of Nandx:
(9) Y0(r) L"Nfr)x(r)".
Becauseall of the capital inputs are purchased from abroad, gross national product (that is,
income for the citizens of the domestic economy) Nisequal to labor's share of gross
domestic product plus the lax revenue collected by the government. Because the total
payment by domestic firms for capital inputs is equal to a fraction a of Y(r) and because
the government collects a fraction rofthese payments as tax revenue, national income can
be written as
(10)
Y,Ar) (1 -a)Y( r) ra Y0(r)
(1 -a+ra)1D®'
Tocalibrate the economy this simple economy, let a=0.5.This is a rough
compromise between the need to keep the markup of price over marginal cost, I/a, from
b;ing too large and to keep the share of labor, a, from being too small. It also makes the
43algebra easy.
Therearetwo tax experimentsthatone canconductinthis simple economy. The first
is to calculatethe losses in output that would occur if the government were to impose an
unexpected tariff (or tax) r after firms have already made their entry decisions. Because
entry costs are sunk costs, this kind of unanticipated tax will have no effect on the number of
goods Nthatare available for use in this economy. This kind of calculation is implicitly
what economists do whenever they hold the set of goods constant and consider only the
deadweight losses from a tax or tariff distortion. Formally, this amounts to inserting N(O)
in place of Nfr)inthe expression for YDfr).Asimple calculation shows that in this
special example, the efficiency loss for this economy, measured as a fraction of national
incomeinthe absence of a tariff varies exactly with the square of the tax or tariff rate:






The other experiment is to consider the effects of a fully anticipated tax. In this case, the tax
reduces Ninaddition to reducing x. Firms that contemplate entry understand that the
monopoly revenue collected after entry will be smaller because of the tax. In this case, the







The difference betweenthewelfare lossesimpliedbythesetwo different experiments
is striking. If the tariff rate r is 10%, the first calculation —theone that holds constant
the set of goods in use —impliesthat national income falls by only 1%, the square of the tax
or tariff rate. The second calculation --theone that lets the set of good vary in response to
reductions in anticipated revenue --impliesthat national income falls by 19.81%. And if
r =.25,the first calculation implies that national income falls by 6.25%. The second
implies that it falls by about 47%. And depending on how one values government revenue,
the effect could be even worse. Gross domestic product and labor income fall by about 58%
when the tax rate is 25%, but government receives revenue equal to about 11% of the no tax
GDP. If part of this tariff revenue is dissipated by collection costs and rent seeking, the loss
to society could be closer to the 58% fall in GDP than to the 47% fall in national income.
There are aspects of this calculation that could bias the estimates of the welfare losses
in either direction. Setting a equal to .5 implies that the elasticity of demand for the
capital goods is 2, a value that is too high and leads to an overstatement of the welfare
losses in both experiments. On the other hand, the assumption that the effects that the
different types of capital goods have on output are additively separable could understate the
losses when the number of goods N can vary. Many different kinds of capital goods and
45many different kinds of economic activities will actually be complements, so that a reduction
in the number of activities and goods that are available locally will have an additional
damping influence on the incentive to undertake any particular activity that this calculation
does not pick up. Recognizing that there are these strong complementarities can help explain
why economic activity tends to cluster in particular geographical regions and why policy
changes can sometimes induce a shift from stagnation to rapid 9ake off." In particular,
complementarities help explain why direct foreign investment in developing nations --the
primary means whereby productive activities and equipment are transplanted from OECD
countries —tendsto be so heavily cpncentrated in just a handful of countries. (For evidence
of the importance of direct foreign investment in the process of development and of its
sensitivity to the costs of doing business, see for example Romer 1993.)
It is also important to remember that this is an example, not a general proof. The
simple results that emerge in this case depend on the choice of simple functional forms and a
convenient choice of the parameter a. A single example is sufficient, however, to overturn
the widespread presumption that the costs of trade restrictions are always small. In at least
some circumstances, the differeice between holding the set of goods constant and allowing it
to vary increases the estimated efficiency losses by an order of magnitude.
VI. Conclusion
Showing that something can be true in a model does not make it so. Only evidence
can settle an assertion of fact such as the one made here --thattrade restrictions, taxes,
46corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and the many other small contributions to the cost of doing
business in a developing country can have very large negative effects on aggregate output
because they can sharply reduce the number of productive activities that are undertaken
there.
In addition, even if we agree that the model is corect, it is not a simple matter to
translatethe model'sinsights into predictions or policy implications about the world. The
model and thought experiment considered here examine the effects of tariffs on imports. For
simplicity, the discussion does not consider the possibility that foreign producers can
undertake production in the developing country and avoid the tariffs. In practice, it is
conceivable that some protectionist policies induced this kind of tariff-jumping investment for
large developing countries and that this process allowed, or even encouraged, increases the
domestic availability of some goods even when tariff bathers were high. The general failure
of import substitution policies suggests that the costs of tariff barriers eventually outweigh
any benefits that come from tariff-jumping, but to understand why import substitution
policies seemed to work in the early years after they were adopted (at least in some
countries), one would have to include domestic production in the analysis. In this extension
of the basic model, the general lesson from the analysis will carry over. What matters for
the workers in a developing country are the other inputs in production that are available
locally for use with their labor. The costs to these workers of implicit and explicit taxes on
the firms that provide new goods and services may be very high.
Even though it is not easy to verify if a model is right, and even it if is difficult to
apply the insights from a simple model in a complicated world, it is important that policy
47makers and economists be willing to consider models that allow for new goods. Models
shape the point of view that we adopt, and our point of view directly influences how we
process, interpret, store, and recall the large quantity of evidence that is available to us.
Working with models forces us to make explicit the habits of mind that we take for granted.
Mathematical models help us examine our implicit assumptions more critically, explore their
implications more systematically, and consider alternatives to them more freely. As evidence
that exposure to models matters for our reading of the evidence, observe that many
intelligent people who are not trained in economics live their whole lives surrounded by
evidence that demand curves slope down, yet never recognize or understand this simple fact.
People trained in the basics of the supply-demand model see the evidence quite differently.
The fundamental claim in this paper is that economists, particularly economists
trained in formal mathematics and general equilibrium theory in the last four decades, have
adopted a point of view and used a collection of models that has led them to substantially
underestimate the aggregate effects of additions to the cost of doing business. In particular,
they have underestimated the costs of tariffs and other restrictions on international trade.
Economists who were familiar 'vith the experience of particular countries have often asserted
that price distortions, taxes, tariffs, and bureaucratic impediments could be of decisive
importance in slowing development, but they often made these claims without much in the
way of theoretical back-up, and without convincing important parts of the profession. The
accepted theoretical approach strongly suggested that distortions of reasonable size should
have only small negative effects on aggregate output, and evidence alone is usually not
enough to convince people. It takes a new theory (or at least a new point of view) to beat an
48old one.
The point of view that impeded progress in economics —oneasserting that nothing
new ever comes around --isdeeply ingrained in human thought and is not easy to overcome.
But the convergence of efforts by economists working on international trade, economic
growth, path dependence in economic history, and innovation at the level of the firm or
industry may finally generate enough focussed attention on this mental stumbling block to
make some headway in overcoming it.
If so, new growth theory will have earned its name, but not in the literal sense in
which it has come to be used. As this paper has emphasized, many of the specific claims
now being emphasized in growth theory have roots that go back at least 150 years. The
larger issues go all the way back to Plato. So there is little that is truly new about the
theory. Nor should the name be interpreted in the ironic sense (emphasized by quotation
marks placed the word new) in which it was first used by critics. There is nothing to
recommend the pursuit of novelty for its own sake, and no one seriously devoted to the study
of growth would argue that originality is what makes this work important.
The term has a different spin that was entirely unplanned but is nonetheless apt. New
growth theory may not be new, but it is abate the unlimited potential for newness that the
world makes possible. And newness, like history, matters.
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